We show that when there is asymmetry of information between the central bank and the public, publication of macroeconomic projections and of the future interest rate path can improve moacroeconomic outcomes. However, the gains from publishing interest rate paths are small relative to those from publishing macroeconomic projections. Given that most inflation targeting central banks are already publishing macroeconomic projections this means that most gains from increasing transparency in this area may already have been reaped. This, together with the potential costs, may explain the relative reluctance of central banks to publish interest rate paths.
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial increase in transparency about actions of monetary authorities. Central bankers widely share the view that their main impact on the economy is not via short-term interest rates they control, but via expectations of future policy actions. It is fairly easy to show, within standard microfounded models used for monetary policy analysis (e.g. Woodford 2003 ) that what matters for economic agents when they make decisions about current prices, investment and consumption is the whole path of future expected interest rates. Taking this into account, central bankers have made a great effort to, at least indirectly, guide these expectations. All inflation targeters 1 (IT) set publicly a numerical target for inflation. Most * We would like to thank P. Soderlind, P. Welz and J.C. Williams for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are our own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the National Bank of Poland.
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publish reports, where they explain their monetary policies. Several central banks decided to publish minutes from meetings of their decision making bodies. Last but not least a vast majority decided to show their inflation and GDP projections. On the other hand, however, only a limited number of central banks decided to do -what on the first view seems the most efficient way of guiding expectations on future interest rates -to publish their view on the most likely path for interest rates. Currently only New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the Czech Republic show explicitly expected interest rate paths. Other banks prefer to guide the markets indirectly 2 .
The last two examples of increasing central bank transparency will be explicitly analysed in this paper. We wonder why most central banks decided to publish macroeconomic projections but only few started to show future interest rate paths. Obviously both decisions bring costs and benefits. Central banks were reluctant to show macroeconomic forecasts because i.a. of possible reputational costs related to being wrong. Moreover they feared that the conditional nature of projections could be misunderstood -high inflation projected under a constant interest rate assumption could fuel inflation expectations instead of showing that monetary policy would be tightened in order to bring inflation back to target. On the other hand central bankers' intuition as well as formal models suggested that publishing projections and showing the model of the economy could improve macroeconomic outcomes. Taking these arguments (and possibly other, like peer pressure (e.g. Fracasso et al. 2003) ) into consideration most inflation targeting central banks decided to follow the path paved by the Bank of England in 1996 and started to publish their macroeconomic projections in the form of fan-charts.
Similar arguments are raised in the debate whether or not to publish interest rate forecasts (Goodhart 2001, King 2007 , Weber 2007 , Rudebusch 2008 ). On the one hand there are costs related to reputation and misunderstandings. Central banks fear that showing an interest rate path may be taken by the public for commitment to follow this path. This could negatively affect the bank's reputation once it deviates from the announced path. Additionally this could lead to sub-optimal allocations if the conditional nature of these paths were not understood properly. Further, it is difficult to embed interest rates paths into the monetary policy decision making process, especially when decisions are taken by committees comprising of more than one member. There is also a risk that revealing interest rates paths could constrain the monetary authority by narrowing the spectrum of its possible future choices, thus undermining policy effectiveness. On the other hand there are potential gains related to better guiding expectations and, as a results, leading to lower volatility of output and inflation.
One possible explanation, why despite potentially similar costs central banks were much more keen to publish macroeconomic projections than interest rate paths is that formally or intuitively they know that the majority of attainable benefits has already been reaped by publishing the macroeconomic projection. In other words, it is relatively difficult for agents to model the economy and make forecasts of output and inflation. In fact only few analysts do so, the majority of the population does not build econometric models. So, improvement in understanding the economy from showing projections can be huge. However, once agents have the projection and observe the behaviour of output and inflation relative to target they can relatively easily show the likely direction in which interest rates will move. Hence, the informational gains from additionally publishing the interest rate path may be minor.
In this paper we treat this problem formally. On the basis of a simple three-equation model of the economy we calculate the potential gains from publishing a macroeconomic projection and compare them to the additional benefits that can be achieved by publishing an interest rate path. In our model there is an asymmetry of information between the central bank and the public which can be reduced either by learning on the side of the public or by publishing forecasts by the central bank. The issue of publishing macroeconomic projections and interest rate paths constitutes only a small subset of this literature. Tarkka and Mayes (1999) show on the basis of a Barro-Gordon model that publishing forecasts improves macroeconomic performance, even if the forecast is imprecise. Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002) show on empirical grounds that publishing central bank forecasts is associated with lower inflation (though endogeneity issues cannot be fully ruled out). Geraats (2005) uses a game theoretic approach to show that publishing macroeconomic forecasts lowers the inflation bias. It must be however noted that the literature also describes negative consequences of central bank transparency. For example in Cukierman's (2000) model the central bank reveals information about upcoming shocks and thus impedes its own ability to stabilise the economy by surprising agents.
The issue of publishing interest rate paths has been taken up in the literature as well. Faust and Leeper (2005) analyse data from macroeconomic projections of the Bank of England, the Fed and the Riksbank. They conclude that the conditional forecasts published by these institutions were of little value to market participants. Instead, they argue, central banks should show unconditional forecasts, based on the most likely path of interest rates. Rudebush and Williams (2006) use a standard New Keynesian model with learning to show that publishing the interest rate path lowers the variability of output and inflation. The gains increase with the difficulty to infer the objectives of monetary authorities. To our knowledge no study attempted to compare the gains from publishing macroeconomic projections and the interest rate path. Our paper tries to fill this gap.
On technical grounds our paper is directly linked to an increasing literature on learning 4 and its adaptation to monetary policy. Learning is a natural framework for analysing the gains from increased central bank transparency. Under rational expectations agents know the economic model and hence, there is no room for the central bank to improve their forecasts by revealing projections. However, if one assumes that agent's knowledge of the economic model is imperfect 5 , central banks (assumed to know the model perfectly) can share their knowledge, hence improve private forecasts and the overall macroeconomic outcome. On the other hand, if a central banks chooses not to disclose its inforamtion, agents can be assumed to follow a learning process, i.e. use past data to estimate the parameters of the underlying model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we describe the issues related to expectation formation. Section 4 presents the simulation results and section 5 concludes.
The Model
Our model consists of three equations: a Phillips curve linking inflation and unemployment, an IS curve linking real interest rates and unemployment and a monetary policy rule driving the nominal interest rate. The first two equations are:
where π denotes inflation, u unemployment, i the nominal interest rate and the superscript e stands for (possibly non-rational) expectations. For convenience, without loss of generality, in what follows the natural rate of unemployment u * will be assumed to be zero. The terms ε π and ε u denote shocks, modelled as AR(1) processes:
where ξ π and ξ u are iid N (0, σ ξπ ) and
This model is closely related to the hybrid version of the standard New Keynesian closed economy model as presented in Gianoni and Woodford (2005) . The main difference between our approach and the New Keynesian model is the presence of the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. This however is only a minor technical issue, since these concepts are closely linked by the Okun law. The main advantage of such specification is that its parameters have been recently estimated for the US economy taking explicitly into consideration forecasts of inflation and unemployment from the Survey of Professional Forecasters -SPF (Orphanides and Williams (2007)). We believe that, in the context of a model used for analysing systems under learning, such an approach to fixing model parameters is superior to the usual practise of calibrating parameters or even estimating them under the assumption of rational expectations.
Our benchmark calibration in equivalent to that of Orphanides and Williams (2007) :
with σ ξ π = 1.11, σ ξ u = 0.29. This model was estimated under the assumption that expectations are formed at period t − 1 and we stick to this assumption throughout the paper regardless of whether they are formed under RE or under learning 6 .
Monetary policy is modelled as a Taylor rule, linking the interest rate to previous period unemployment and inflation:
where ε i denotes a monetary policy shock, which is assumed AR (1):
where
This reflects the fact that the behaviour of monetary authorities cannot be described precisely by a simple (or even complicated) rule. Central bankers take various information into account moreover, given voting procedures, their decision cannot be treated as a linear function of the underlying economic factors. We model these issues in form of a monetary policy shock. Following the estimation in Smets and Wouters (2007) and deWalque and Wouters (2004) we set its standard deviation to σ ξ i = 0.22.
In our benchmark specification all shocks are assumed to be white noise, i.e ρ π = ρ u = ρ i = 0. However, when performing robustness checks we allow the presence of autocorrelation.
We consider three variants of determination of the Taylor rule's parameters:
• Standard parameters as suggested by Taylor (1993) corrected for the fact that instead of the output gap we use the unemployment gap. Taking into account that the variability of unemployment is about 1/4 of the variability of output, our Taylor rule becomes:
• Optimal parameters derived from minimization of the central bank's loss function under the assumption of agents following rational expectations. Under this rule the central bank follows the same policy regardless of whether agents' expectations are formed rationally or under learning.
• Optimal parameters derived from minimization of the central bank's loss function, whereas this time the central bank takes into account the way agents' expectations are formed.
In the latter cases the central bank minimizes the discounted sum of losses stemming from variability of inflation, unemployment and interest rates:
For our model we assume λ u = 4 and λ i = 0.25, which is equivalent to a standard loss function with the weight on inflation and output gap variability being equal and four times higher than the weight on interest rate variability.
We decided to restrict our attention to the functional form of a Taylor rule and ignore fully optimal (discretionary or commitment-based) policies for the following reasons:
• First, the functional form of such policies depends crucially on the underlying model. We thought that it may be unrealistic to assume that agents know the functional form of complicated, model-specific reaction function. On the other hand assuming that the functional form estimated by agents differs from the true reaction function may result in non-convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
• Second, the literature shows that introducing optimal policies to models with learning may result in indeterminancy (e.g. 
Expectations
We consider three variants of private agents expectations' formation, depending on the information on the economy and central bank preferences they posses. This information is assumed to be conditional on what the central bank reveals.
The first variant, denoted by V1 refers to a situation when agents do not know the true structure of the model driving the economy, the parameters of this model nor the central bank policy rule. Such a setup may be considered to correspond to an opaque central bank who does not share the results of his research on the structure of the economy nor macroeconomic projections with the public. In addition it does not disclose the rule it uses to set interest rates. Like all IT central banks, it reveals to the public the numerical inflation target, and the policy interest rate. Its projections, models and possible future interest rate paths are kept secret 7 .
Having no knowledge about the true model of the economy nor the central bank policy rule, agents learn them on the basis of past data. To do so, they estimate a three-variable VAR(1), reflecting their perceived low of motion (PLM):
Estimation of the coefficient matrix A is performed equation by equation with standard OLS. The estimation sample is a moving window and in the baseline scenario it covers 80 last observations, i.e. from t − 80 till t − 1; the earlier data is simply forgotten by agents.
This VAR is next applied to compute expectations i e t+1 , u e t+1 and π e t+1 . A two period-ahead dynamic forecasts is computed according to:
and
where (ρ u , ρ π , ρ i ) is assumed to be known to agents (otherwise it could be estimated). Shocks ξ u,t , ξ π,t and ξ i,t at periods t and t + 1 are assumed to be unknown to the agents, therefore in the computations they use expectations based on the autoregressive processes (3), (4) and (8) .
The expectations i e t+1 , u e t+1 and π e t+1 are then plugged into the true model of the economy, consisting of (1), (2) and (7), to obtain the actual law of motion (ALM).
The second variant V2 differs from V1 in that economic agents know the structure of the model driving the economy (i.e. equations (1) and (2)) and its parameters. They still do not know the preferences of the central bank, i.e. the parameters of its policy rule. Such a framework may be regarded as approximating the situation when the central bank publishes projections of output and inflation conditional on a standard interest rate path (e.g. constant or expected by the market). It also shows the model it uses to describe the economy, which is assumed to be indeed the true model driving it 8 . But the central bank does not disclose its unconditional future interest rate path.
The setup represented by V2 is quite popular among central banks that conduct policy under IT at present. Many of them limit their transparency and communication with markets to disclosing conditional forecasts and models they are based on while remaining reluctant to publishing future interest rate paths.
Since agents know the model driving the economy, all they need in addition to build expectations for t + 1 is the policy rule. Similarly to V1, they learn it from past data, which is used to estimate the policy rule:
The estimation is performed by OLS, on an 80-period moving sample in the baseline case.
Next, agents add the estimated policy rule to the model of the economy published by the central bank ( (1) and (2)). Therefore the model (PLM) they use to compute expectations for t+1 becomes:
where estimates of parameters, obtained through learning, are denoted with hats:φ π andφ u . The model is solved under rational expectations, given the data for period t − 1, and the solution is used to obtain u e t+1 , π e t+1 and i e t+1 . Similarly to V1, the values of innovations ξ u , ξ π and ξ i at time t and t + 1 are assumed unknown, and therefore taken at their expected values equal zero, and the shocks ε π,t , ε x,t , ε x,t are calculated according to (3) , (4) and (8) .
The third variant V3 assumes full knowledge on the side of economic agents. They know the model driving the economy together with its parameters and also the central bank policy rule. This setup, with no asymmetric information, may be regarded as referring to a central bank publishing projections, models and unconditional paths of its future policy rates. It discloses all its information to the public. Technically, (1), (2) and (7) are solved under rational expectations with the same timing assumptions as in V1 and V2.
As in V2, it is assumed that the central bank has full and correct knowledge of the economy and the model it uses and publishes, consisting of equations (1), (2) and (7), indeed depicts the actual law of motion of the economy.
The information structure of the variants described above is summarised in Table 1 
Simulations
We run stochastic simulations in order to compare central bank losses under different stages of transparency discussed above. Each simulation run spans over T sim periods, for which the values of π, u and i are computed. We take T sim = 100, 000, and burn the first b = 1000 initial, for we consider them being too much dependent on initial conditions.
We analyse three simulation cases, each with different policy rule coefficients, according to the classification presented in section 2. The first one assumes Taylor rule coefficients at standard values of φ π = 1.5 and φ u = −2 and is denoted by S TR. In the second case, denoted by ML TR RE, the average central bank loss is first minimized subject to policy rule coefficients over the entire simulation span and under the assumption of agents following rational expectations (variant V3). The policy rule with optimal coefficients for this variant is next applied in simulations for two remaining variants V1 and V2. In the third case, ML TR, the most complex one, Taylor rule coefficients are chosen for each variant separately so that they minimize the average central bank loss.
In a theoretical setup, according to (10) , central bank loss is computed over the infinite horizon. In simulations we restrict the horizon to h = 500 periods ahead since β h is insignificantly different from zero 9 for higher values of h. So, the central bank loss in period t is computed as:
9 We take β = 0.99. Then β 500 ≈ 0.006
Minimization of the average central bank loss (AL) to pick the policy rule coefficients goes as follows:
The minimization is performed numerically. The initial vector for V3 is [φ u , φ π ] = [−1.5, 1.5]. The initial vector for V1 is the argmin reached for V3 and for V2 -the argmin obtained for V1.
Agents can choose different sample lengths of past data for the purpose of learning. In the baseline scenario it is assumed that the learning sample smpl stretches over 80-periods (20 years), which corresponds 10 to the perpetual learning gain κ = 0.0125. Orphanides and Williams (2007) find that κ ∈ (0.01, 0.04) perform best in modelling SPF expectations. They also report that this value is in line with Sheridan's (2003) analysis of expectations from the Livingston Survey data. For the sake of robustness, we also analyse different values of smpl, ranging from 40 to 120. In the process of learning, the regressions run by agents are tested for stationarity. Should this test be breached, the models' coefficients used to produce expectations are set equal to the average of parameters applied in the previous periods. In practise, we found this restriction binding only with negligible frequency.
Results
The results for the baseline scenario are summarised in Tables 2 and 3 . In order to easily compare the gains from publishing the macroeconomic model and from publishing the policy rule we calculate gains defined as:
where G i/j stands for gain in variant i versus variant j, and AL i denotes average central bank loss in variant i.
The following findings stem from the baseline scenario simulations:
• Central bank loss decreases while moving from West to East in the Table 2 for any policy rule. This indicates that adopting further transparency stages pays off.
• In all cases, gains for V2 vs. V1 are much higher than for V3 vs. V2. This points to benefits from publishing macroeconomic projections being substantially higher than gain from additionally showing the future interest rate path. For instance, under the optimized policy rule (ML TR) publication of conditional forecast improves central bank loss by 20.74 per cent compared to improvement of only 5.5 following the publication of unconditional path of future interest rates.
• Comparison of central bank losses under the rule optimized for rational expectations (ML TR RE) and the optimized rule (ML TR) confirms that the central bank can benefit from optimizing the policy rule coefficients subject to the agents' actual information. For example, compare • The coefficients on inflation and unemployment in policy rule decrease along the W-E direction for the case of optimized policy (ML TR) ( Table 3 ). This can be interpreted as a need to limit the necessary degree of central bank responsiveness once agents get more information on the economy and central bank preferences, ie. when transparency increases. Such a result is consistent with the concept of using the central bank communication channel as support to other transmission channels. (2006)). Our main contribution is the result that gains from disclosing the path of future interest rate by central banks that have already engaged in publishing macroeconomic projections may be lower than those achieved after embarking on disclosing macro-projections and macromodels they are based on. Weighted against fears of revealing future interest rate path, this may explain the reluctance of certain central banks to push their transparency framework that far.
To get an insight about the robustness of our results we also run the simulations for different lengths of the past data span smpl that agents use for learning and also for different degrees of To enable comparisons, all the remaining parameters were left unchanged at the benchmark scenario values, i.e. during each simulation run only the value of smpl or shock autocorrelation ρ was altered. The range of smpl under analysis spanned from 40 to 120 with a step of 20. In case of ρ, the domain stretched from 0.1 to 0.5, with a 0.1 step. We assumed the same degree of autocorrelation for all the shocks, i.e ρ π = ρ u = ρ i . Results of simulations are depicted in Figure 1 . They confirm the main finding that the gains from publishing the interest rate path are modest as compared to publication of macroeconomic forecasts. As the sample length smpl used by agents rises the central bank loss tends to be lower. This is in line with the intuition that using larger data sets by agents enables them to better approximate the true law of motion of the economy and thus lower central bank loss.
As can be seen from Figure 2 , gains from increasing transparency are lower for higher smpl. When agents use more data and thus come up with more accurate estimates, providing them with information from the central bank helps less.
Adding autocorrelation to the processes generating shocks makes it more difficult for agents to learn the law of motion driving the economy, because they assume independence of shocks while learning. This is confirmed by the results for ρ in Figure 1 . As can be seen from the gains in Figure 2 , the more autocorrelation in the shocks, and thus agents more likely to be wrong, the higher are the gains from central bank transparency.
Conclusions
In this paper we examined the relative gains from publishing macroeconomic projections and interest rate paths by central banks. Our results were based on a simple three-equation model developed under the assumption of information asymmetry between the public and the central bank. This information gap can be filled either by learning on the side of the public or by publishing forecasts (macroeconomic or interest rate) by the central bank. Our model shows that the gains from publishing the macroeconomic projection dominate the gains from additionally publishing the interest rate path. This, in our opinion, reflects the intuition that it is relatively hard for agents to forecast economic developments. However, once they have a hint on how the economy is expected to move, they can relatively easily guess what will happen to interest rates in the near future.
We think that this may be one of the reasons for why inflation targeting central banks, of which most already publish macroeconomic projections, are relatively reluctant to start publishing interest rate paths. Although we strongly believe that most banks will sooner or later follow the path paved by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank and start publishing interest rate projections, this reluctance seems symptomatic to us. It may be a sign that central banks intuitively know what we show formally -that most gains from showing forecast have already been reaped by publishing macroeconomic projections.
